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Greeks Said to Accept Cyprus Partition; Greeks Apprehensive on Issue Leader of the Turkish Community Expects Early Negotiations Realities Are Realized'

• PERMISSIONS

By JAMES F. CLARITYSpecial to The New York Times ();

September 04, 1974,

, Section , Page 3, Column , words

[ DISPLAYING ABSTRACT ]

Rauf Denktash, head of the Turkish Cypriote administration, said today that Greece and the Greek Cypriote Government had privately conceded that Cyprus would be formally divided into two zones, one for the ethnic Greeks and the other for the Turkish community.

http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=980DE5D61E3CEF34BC4C53DFBF66838F669EDE#

http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/johnsonlb/xvi/4770.htm

http://www.churchofcyprus.org.cy/documents/EN.pdf

http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/zenon,%201963-74.html

http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/zenon,%201963-74.html

Conflict Between the States of Cyprus, 1963-1974 The political and economic significance of the separation that began in 1964 with 20-25,000 Turkish Cypriots seeking refuge in enclaves is here elucidated by Dr. Zenon Stavrinides, who has been a journalist, an analyst of the conflict, and a professor of philosophy in Cyprus and Britain. A Greek Cypriot by birth and educated in philosophy England, Stavrinides wrote this short book, The Cyprus Conflict: National Identity and Statehood, in 1976, and it was virtually banned in the Greek part of the island because of its critical understanding of the crisis. It is particularly valuable because it pinpoints briefly and precisely the main points of the Cyprus problem as it appeared just after the Turkish intervention of 1974. This excerpt, moreover, concentrates on the emerging nationalist positions of the two sides in the critical period of the mid to late 1960s. It remains a uniquely valuable work of analysis. Stavrinides is the founder of a inter-communal in London, the Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Affairs.  The Greek State and the Turkish State of Cyprus. . . Within the armed enclaves which the Turks created, a system of political, administrative, judicial, social and other institutions was set up, which eventually took almost all the organic characteristics of a small state. The Greeks, of course, refused to recognize it, and the Turks did not ask for recognition from other countries, if only because they knew they would not get it. But although it lacked the name of a state, what the Turkish Cypriots created was in essence a small national state, existing within defended borders, with its own Government (called after December 1967 the Turkish Cypriot Administration) public services, and even luxuries like a Football Federation and a Scouting Movement. Dr Kucuk headed the Turkish Cypriot Administration until February 1973, when he was succeeded by Mr Rauf Denktas.. The "official" State of Cyprus was now left entirely in Greek hands and Makarios and his all-Greek Government continued to be recognized by foreign countries and international organizations as the Government of the Republic. The all-Greek House of Representatives continued to pass laws under the 1960 Constitution - with some of its provisions changed or ignored - laws which were enforced throughout the territory of the Republic except for the Turkish 'no go" areas. The position of the Turkish population in Greek-controlled territory - and considerable numbers remained there until July 1974 - was rather ambiguous. They were subject to the jurisdiction of Greek Cypriot authorities and laws, but they also recognized the authority of, and gave allegiance to, those institutions that operated in the Turkish areas; for example all Turkish Cypriot young men, wherever they may have lived, served in the Turkish Cypriot conscript Army. Besides, these Turkish inhabitants of Greek-controlled areas could not vote in the elections for the Presidency and the 'Greek" House of Representatives, or apply for a post in the "Greek" Civil Service or Police (but they had such rights with regard to similar institutions created in the Turkish-controlled areas). These people, then, did not have full citizenship rights in the official Greek-run State, so all Turkish Cypriots, in whatever part of Cyprus they may have lived, identified themselves with, and supported, the >unofficial= Turkish-run quasi-State. From December 1963 onwards, the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots must be understood in terms of the relationship between two independent systems of formal institutions which claimed to express the national identity, will and interests of the two Communities. Indeed, most of the actual fighting that occurred sporadically until November 1967 was carried out by regular armies belonging to the two national States of Cyprus, the 'official" and >unofficial=. In February 1968 - at the time when an uneasy peace prevailed under the worried eyes of UN observers and troops - Makarios obtained thorough new Presidential elections a (Greek) popular mandate to negotiate with >the cohabitant element= a settlement for a new unitary State. Since June 1968, representatives of the two sides met regularly in an effort to arrive at a new constitutional arrangement. As was said earlier, substantial progress was made on many issues, but the thorny question of the jurisdiction and powers of the local administrations was not finally resolved. So on the eve of the military coup which temporarily toppled President Makarios there were in Cyprus two power poles, representing two separate political and economic organizations, existing on separate territorial bases. It is impossible in this limited study to give a comprehensive account of the relationship between the two Cypriot communities and States. What I wish to illuminate in this section are the different forms which Greek and Turkish nationalisms have taken in the last decade, under conditions of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 'national" statehood. After 21st December 1963, very much more than before then, Greek and Turkish nationalisms became matters of official policy and inspiration. The Greek and Turkish leaderships needed to arouse and rally their communities around them, and win the sympathy of foreign press and international public opinion. Thus, the Greek and Turkish radio stations, newspapers, politicians and speech-makers plunged into a passionate and vicious propaganda war, attributing evil motives and the worst faith to the opposite side, and especially the opposite side's leaders. The image of the Turks which the Greek side cultivated (consciously or unconsciously) was either that they were a minority of greedy people who, owing to an Anglo-Turkish conspiracy, obtained a Constitution that gave them super-privileges at the expense of the Greek majority and resorted to armed rebellion when the Greeks made a firm stand on their legitimate democratic rights; or alternatively (and a little more generously) that they were basically plain and sensible, if uncultivated, folk, who were the victims of an evil and self-seeking leadership that would send them to their own destruction. On the Turkish side the Greeks were presented and viewed as an unscrupulous and violent people, a part of the Greek nation that had long been the opponents of the Turkish nation, and who, in their pursuit of enosis, used cunning and force to break up the established constitutional arrangements, and all that these implied in terms of cooperation - and peaceful coexistence. From inside their armed enclaves the Turkish Cypriots developed a theory - the joint product of official policy and popular belief - that they could no longer entrust their safety to Greeks and it was therefore even more important that it had seemed earlier that they should live in separate areas, governed and policed by themselves. As if to prove their point the Turkish leadership exerted pressure on many Turks living in Greek areas to leave their homes and properties and come to the Turkish enclaves to live as refugees. The Greek side got hold of, and published, an official Turkish document which stated that 'a fine of ,25 or other severe punishment, and one month's imprisonment or whipping' would be imposed on Turks residing in the enclaves who entered Greek areas without special permit, or who did so (permit or no permit) for the purpose of visiting Greek Courts, hospitals and other State institutions, or for business with Greeks, or friendly association with Greeks, or for promenade, or amusement. U Thant, in a report presented to the UN on 11th March 1965 stated that: The Turkish Cypriot policy of self-isolation has led the community in the opposite direction from normality. The community leadership discourages the Turkish Cypriot population from engaging in personal, commercial or other contacts with their Greek Cypriot compatriots, from applying to Government offices in administrative matters or from resettling in their home villages if they are refugees. So, whereas Turkish nationalist propaganda claimed that Turks cannot live in safety in the midst of the Greek community, Greek propaganda countered that by saying that Greeks and Turks had always lived together in peace and they would be doing so now if it was not for the separatist designs of the evil Turkish leadership. The Turkish leaders, however, and their propaganda machine got a godsend in the form of the publication in the Greek pro-Grivas newspaper Patris (issue of 21st April 1966) of a top secret document which in their view showed the Greek Cypriot leadership in their true light. This was the famous Akritas Plan, drawn up by the Greek Cypriot leaders and Greek Army officers in 1963. According to Patris - whose professed intention was to expose the mishandling of the Greek 'national cause' by Makarios and his associates - the Archbishop set up a secret organization and appointed the Minister of the Interior Yeorgadjis as its head, under the nom de guerre of Chief Akritas. The document itself states at the beginning that 'as the final objective [of our organization] remains unchanged, what must be dwelt upon is the method to be employed towards attaining that objective'. In fact the content of the Akritas Plan consists of the exposition of a method by which enosis is to be pursued. The rationale behind the chosen method is presented in the following words: It is obvious that today international public opinion is against any form of oppression, especially of minorities. The Turks have so far been able to convince world public opinion that the union of Cyprus with Greece will amount to their enslavement. Under these circumstances we stand a good chance of success in influencing international public opinion if we base our struggle not on enosis but on self-determination. But in order to be able to exercise the right of self-determination fully and without hindrance we must first get rid of the Agreements (i.e. the Treaty of Guarantee, the Treaty of Alliance etc) and of those provisions of the Constitution which inhibit the free and unbridled expression of the will of the people and which carry dangers of external interference. For this reason our first target has been the Treaty of Guarantee, which is the first Agreement to be cited as not being recognized by the Greek Cypriots. When the Treaty of Guarantee is removed, no legal or moral force will remain to obstruct us in determining our future through a plebiscite. The actual procedure to be followed is, briefly: First create the impression in the international field that the Cyprus problem has not been solved, and consequently the Zurich-London Agreements and Constitution will have to be reviewed. Then put forward proposals which seem reasonable and justified. It is evident that for intervention [from Turkey] to be justified there must be more serious reason and more immediate danger than constitutional amendments... In case of a planned or unplanned attack by the Turks, whether this is staged or not, it is necessary to suppress this forcefully in the shortest possible time, since, if we manage to become the masters of the situation within a day or two, outside intervention would not be possible, probable or justifiable. It should be noted that the Akritas Plan was never disclaimed by Makarios or the other Greek leaders. And although the Plan was abandoned after the first intercommunal fighting - when the Greeks failed to become masters of the situation 'within a day or two' - Makarios continued to proclaim that (to take for example the statement he made to the London ITN on 15th June 1966): AThe demand for enosis is based on the democratic principle of self-determination... enosis is a right of the people.@ Earlier, in April 1965, he rejected the recommendation of the UN Mediator in Cyprus that the exercise of self-determination should be short of enosis. After all, the point of relegating the Turkish community to the status of a minority and invoking the full application of the principle of self-determination was none other than achieving enosis. The Turkish Cypriot Nationalist PositionTo understand the nature of the official Turkish Cypriot nationalist position after 1963 it is necessary to see what the Turkish leaders had learned, or thought they had learned, from their years of 'partnership' and their study of the Akritas Plan. First of all it is impossible to resist the conclusion that Makarios and the other Greek leaders never honestly intended to co-operate with the Turkish leaders under a bicommunal type of Constitution, let alone be satisfied with a mere 13 amendments of the 1960 Constitution. As the Akritas Plan makes it clear, the demand for 'reasonable' amendments would be only the first step of reducing the Turkish community to the status of a mere minority unable to effectively control the will of the Greek majority. Once this was achieved, and the Treaty of Guarantee nullified, there would be nothing stopping the Greek leadership from appealing to the principle of self-determination, which means in the context of Cyprus that a monolithic majority of Greeks can decide for a monolithic minority of Turks too, and proclaim enosis. Further (as the Turks saw it) the Greeks believed that the objective of enosis justified, if necessary, the use of violent means. These considerations have influenced the shape of the Turkish position in the following ways : (i) Any new agreements that may be reached with the Greeks must definitely and unequivocally exclude enosis. Resistance to enosis, and any measure that may be a 'first step' to enosis, is an axiom of Turkish nationalism. Of course Makarios, inspired by Greek nationalism and not wishing to be branded a traitor for a second time by his ultra-nationalist opponents, would be unwilling to sign away enosis, or even to stop talking about it. This gives prominence to a second feature of the Turkish position. (ii) A reconstituted Republic of Cyprus which the Turks can agree to become a part of, should be a bicommunal State, of which they must have a measure of effective control. As Mr Denktas put it (in his Rotary Club address): The Greeks by themselves cannot be the masters of the destiny of a bicommunal independent Republic of Cyprus, because that would mean no protection at all for the Turks in Cyprus, and Cyprus would ultimately be united with Greece. We must realize that that road must be kept closed if we are going to find the conditions of peaceful co-existence in Cyprus. Thus, Turkish nationalism means, among other things, a perception of the Turkish community as one of the constituents of the Cypriot population, and a belief in the necessity for the community's representatives to be partners (albeit junior partners) in the Government of Cyprus. A mere minority they will not be. (iii) A more specific doctrine of Turkish Cypriot nationalism is that, since the 'functional federation' of 1960-63 (i.e. the bicommunal control of state functions) was a failure, any new settlement must provide for a geographically-based federation. The Greek concept of a unitary State, under a Greek-dominated Government, was unacceptable. The Turks wanted to be in a position to govern and police certain areas which they could call their own, because (a) as they repeatedly claimed, they could not entrust their security in the hands of Greeks; (b) they needed to ensure that the Greeks could not repeat the 'experiment' of December 1963 and attempt to unite the island with Greece; and (c) Cyprus was their country too and they wanted to be the masters of their own land. The desire for self management can be as fundamental a motive for political action as the need for security. (iv) The last point (c) may be clarified by highlighting another aspect of Turkish Cypriot nationalism which is not very easy to put into words. From the beginnings of the Greek Cypriot nationalist movement, the Greeks spoke of Cyprus as 'their island', and claimed that she belongs to the glorious Greek people and that the existence of the Turkish community is a regrettable aberration of history. The Turks could point out to many statements made by Greek leaders, even during the 'partnership' years, which implied that the Turkish presence mars the purity of the Greek island. In response to such Greek attitudes, Turkish nationalism asserts the dignity of the Turkish community and the rights and values of the Turks of Cyprus. This sentiment has been expressed by Mr Denktas in his Rotary Club address as follows: We are part of Cyprus. You can't throw us out. So accommodate us. Let's accommodate ourselves. We don't want much. But we don't want to be 'not wanted'. That is the difficulty. For years we have been told by words and by action that we are not wanted in Cyprus, that Cyprus is not ours. And that... makes any community very angry, and makes any community entitled, at least in their own conscience, to take all steps in order to prove that a land where they have lived for centuries is theirs and they intend to keep it as such. Turkish Cypriot separatism, then, can only be understood as a nationalist effort to resist the absorption of the Turkish community by a Greek State or a Greek-dominated Cypriot State. The Greek Cypriot Nationalist PositionsLet us now look at what happened in the Greek community of Cyprus from 1963 to 1974. This period exhibits two important trends that must be understood and accounted for: (a) the majority of Greek Cypriots gradually lost much of their fervour and concern for the struggle for enosis', and (b) those who remained committed to the Greek 'national cause' were divided into two competing nationalist camps which I shall call, for obvious reasons, the Makariosites and the Grivasites. I shall develop the second point first. Makarios never appeared to have regretted the fact that his 13 point proposals, made against the background of suspicion and tension, precipitated the break-up of the bicommunal State. Probably he thought that the ensuing state-within-the-State situation was preferable to what preceded it. At least the events of December 1963 got him off the Zurich-London hook, and now he felt free to lead his people in a new struggle towards a goal which would certainly not be a Greco-Turkish State. What was this new goal to be? The answer was given by him in scores of speeches and other public statements he made before and after December 1963. To take a quite typical example, on 3rd November 1963 at Paralimni Church he said: What is our desire? We have proclaimed it many times: our union with the Motherland, eternal Greece. What will our reply be if such a solution is made difficult, and if some think compromises are required or that something be given in return? No is the reply, and the struggle will continue until complete fulfilment. Again in interviews with Greek Cypriot newspapers he explained his position in these terms: The real victory will be achieved when Cyprus will be annexed to Greece without any concessions whatever... I am for enosis, but it must be genuine enosis without curbs or strings. (Ethniki newspaper, 1.10.67). The same idea was expressed by the House of Representatives which, on 26th June 1967, passed unanimously the following resolution: Interpreting the age-long aspirations of the Greeks of Cyprus, the House declares that despite any adverse circumstances it will not suspend the struggle conducted with the support of all Greeks, until this struggle succeeds in uniting the whole and undivided Cyprus with the Motherland, without any intermediary stages. These statements represent the position which Makarios and the official Greek Cypriot leadership held since the time of the Zurich-London Agreements and which, more fully expressed, amounts to the following propositions: (i) The ideal of enosis is proclaimed to be the fundamental principle which guides the aspirations and long-term policies of Greek Cypriots. (ii) It is recognized that there are certain 'difficulties' standing in the way to enosis: Turkey is prepared to go to war to prevent its realization, unless she is given in exchange large military bases and/or other substantial territorial concessions. The Turkish condition - occasionally supported by the United States and NATO - is definitely unacceptable to the Greeks. (iii) It is recognized (though rarely said in public) that Greece is unwilling to go to war with Turkey, because Turkey is militarily not weaker than Greece, and only 40 miles away from the island. A war between Greece and Turkey over Cyprus would result, at the most optimistic estimate, in the territorial partition of the island. (iv) As long as enosis is 'not feasible' the duty of the Greeks is to keep Cyprus an independent and undivided Greek-dominated island - which means that the Turkish minority must not be allowed to control either the functions of the State or territory. Under changed circumstances, at some point in the unspecified future, Turkey may become unable to intervene in support of the Turkish Cypriots, and then Greek Cypriots should be ready and able to seize the opportunity to complete the union of the whole Cyprus with Motherland. Thus enosis is not to be excluded by any new (non-permanent) settlement which the Greek and Turkish sides may reach. This, then, was Makarios's nationalist stand: commitment to the traditional enosis ideal is still definitive of the 'true' Greek, but this commitment is now qualified by a measure of understanding of political and military realities. On this nationalist platform Makarios was re-elected President in February 1968 with 95.45 per cent of the votes cast, and re-elected for a third term unopposed five years later. It might be inferred that the vast majority of Greek Cypriots were Makariosite nationalists; but the actual facts were, as will be explained, much more complicated: they were Makariosites, but not nearly as nationalist as their Ethnarch and his associates. It was said earlier that Makarios was opposed by Grivas and a small number of ardent enosis supporters almost as soon as he signed the London Agreements. In the early years of the Republic, the Grivasites (who included in their numbers ex-EOKA fighters not accommodated by the Yeorgadjis patronage system) agitated in favour of removing Turkish 'super-privileges' and re-activating the diplomatic and military struggle for enosis. In 1969-1970 these ultranationalist elements joined, or supported a clandestine organisation called the National Front, which tried to overthrow the Government by a guerrilla campaign and very nearly succeeded in assassinating Makarios. The campaign of the National Front came to nothing, and in September 1971, Grivas himself came to Cyprus to organize a new version of EOKA, EOKA-B. Grivas's supporters, although never very many, were a mixed bag of people from the point of view of their social background, political philosophy and motives. They all defined their position by reference to the ideal of enosis, which they did not regard as 'not feasible' and considered themselves as the 'pure' enosis supporters. Their declared views, however, amounted more to criticisms of Makarios himself, than to any coherent and thought-out nationalist doctrine. Typically, a Grivasite nationalist held all or most of the following beliefs : (i) The Greeks should immediately stop negotiating with the Turks on the basis of an independent State, and begin a diplomatic, and if necessary military, struggle with the sole aim of achieving enosis. (ii) Makarios must be removed from office because, despite his nationalist poses, he does not really want enosis. Having concentrated all political and ecclesiastical power, and much economic power, in his hands, he simply enjoys playing 'Pope-Caesar' in an independent State. (iii) He maintains himself in power by means of his hold over the Church, the Police and also irregular armed bands; his control of the Radio, Television and a large section of the press; illiberal laws aimed at strangling the voice of the opposition; nepotism and bribery; systematic harassment of 'true' and 'pure' enosis fighters and supporters. (iv) He is incompetent to conduct the internal and foreign policy of Cyprus, and (as the publication of the Akritas Plan was calculated to show) has made a mess of the Greek 'national cause'. (v) He is responsible for the dilution of Greek nationalist feeling among the Greek Cypriot masses, who have gradually lost their earlier pride in their Hellenic heritage, and become complacent about their 'hermaphrodite' Cypriot State. Under the leadership of Makarios, the masses are now a spineless lot who lire less concerned with their national destiny, and more with making money, buying houses, running in fast cars and generally aping West European decadent ways.The last point is the most obscure, but the most interesting. It suggests that there is a connection between the watering-down of the nationalist sentiment of the Greek population at large and the economic prosperity which Cyprus experienced since the late 1960s; and it also blames Makarios for this. The Grivasite 'cultural criticism' is simple-minded, but it half-recognizes certain important facts about popular political attitudes among Greek Cypriots, which we must now turn our attention to. During 1960-63 - when EOKA memories were still fresh - Makarios and his associates, and also a number of ultra-nationalist personalities of the Grivasite opposition, found it possible to keep popular nationalist feeling astir, and public discussion concerned with the necessity to curb Turkish super-privileges. During the violent year of 1964, when the Greeks raised a conscript Army - the National Guard - to fight the Turks, and a military force of more than 10,000 men was clandestinely sent from Greece to resist a possible invasion from Turkey, there was little else that ordinary people could think and talk about than the 'national cause'. After 1964, however, when comparative calm returned to Cyprus - at least there were few incidents in population centres - Greek people increasingly concerned themselves with less heroic affairs, and more everyday life problems. Makarios continued to resist successfully any attempt from the Grivasite opposition to outbid him in the nationalist word-game with utterances such as (to take for example a speech he made on 26th May 1965): Either the whole of Cyprus is to be united with Greece or become a holocaust... The road to the fulfillment of national aspirations may be full of difficulties, but we shall reach the goal -- which is enosis -- alive or dead... - but it must not be supposed that ordinary Greek people much fancied the idea of Cyprus becoming a holocaust. They kept on applauding the speeches of their leaders, Makariosites and Grivasites, not only because they dared not do otherwise, but also because they were genuinely moved by them. After all, if your idolized leader, Makarios, Grivas (who commanded the National Guard until he was recalled to Athens in December 1967) or anyone else tells you that you are a heroic people, you are unlikely to throw away the compliment. The fact remains, however, that once popular anxiety eased - when fighting died down and certain 'abnormalities' were accepted - a host of other day-to-day problems demanded an increasing amount of the attention of ordinary people. There is the family income that must be secured, business to be transacted, the children's education to be looked after, and the daughter has reached marriageable age etc, etc. So, while on Sundays and special days the people participated in the ritual of celebrating the enosis ideal and the heroes who struggled for it, on ordinary week-days their thought turned to more mundane subjects. Their earlier apprehension and resentment, which had made them so aggressive, gradually disappeared. At least three factors brought about this change in the mind of the ordinary Greek Cypriot. (i) The Greeks no longer had to hear of the Turks occupying 30 per cent of the posts of the state institutions. Indeed, many more Greeks were now the glad occupants of such posts. The Government, the House of Representatives, the Civil Service, the Radio and Television - all these were now in Greek hands. The official Cypriot State, under which all Greeks lived, was a Greek Cypriot State. (ii) Again, the Greeks no longer had to fear the Vice-Presidential veto, or that the Turkish members of the House of Representatives may block financial legislation. The House was now free to rubber-stamp the bills sent there by the all-Greek Government. (iii) And this is the most curious feature of the attitudes of Greek people: they were pleased that they had prevented the implementation of the separate municipalities and other 'unjust' provisions of the Constitution. The strong stand put up by their leaders paid off, and now they could live without the danger of the establishment of Turkish-controlled areas, which (as Makarios had repeatedly stated) would be the first step to the partitioning of the territory of Cyprus. The obvious response to (iii) is that the Turks had established their own areas and created a system of institutional and administrative structures which carried the support of the Turkish population. So, wasn't Cyprus already partitioned? Wasn't there a Turkish 'State' within their own Greek State? According to the Greek view, the Turkish institutions - which were contemptuously referred to as 'the pseudo-mini-'State', 'the so-called Turkish Cypriot Administration', 'the pirate Radio', 'the illegal Police, Post Office etc' - were not permanent features of Cyprus, but elements of a temporary anomaly. They did not really enjoy the support of the Turkish Cypriot masses, but were maintained by the money and force of arms of mainland Turkey and her Turkish Cypriot puppets! This situation could not go on for ever, and sooner or later (and the sooner, the better for the Turks) the rebellious minority would have to come back to the official unitary and integrated State. The unity of 'their' island would eventually be restored - and certainly not under the unjust, unworkable and separatist 1960 Constitution. But, it might be asked, if the separation of the Turkish community was only temporary, so was the Greek community's monopoly of the official state institutions. Did the Greeks think that the Turks would return to the fold of the State without a generous share of power and resources, and without various forms of checks and balances similar to those of the 1960 Constitution? And if the Greeks were intent on preventing the re-activation of that Constitution or the drafting of a similar one, why did they suppose that the Turks would agree to come back - especially now that they had tasted self-government? Wasn't the re-integration of Cyprus contingent upon the re-establishment of bicommunal control of the State? Or could it seriously be supposed that Turkey would let her kith and kin go on their knees and beg from the Greeks admission to the fold of the State whatever the terms? It is difficult to see how the average Greek Cypriot would answer these questions, or whether his political beliefs did actually amount to a coherent and rational view of the situation. In the new, much more relaxed atmosphere that developed within the Greek community after 1964, and particularly from 1968 onwards, the vast majority of Greeks thought less and less, and less and less seriously, about the Turks and the achievement of the union of Cyprus with Greece. Their adversaries were, after all, not to be seen in the Ministries or other Government Departments, or the House of Representatives, or the Police, or the Radio and Television, or any other area of the State - so the crisis was behind them and the Government would keep the situation under control. Indeed, as far as the majority of Greek Cypriots were concerned, the Turks were entirely out of sight. There were, true, the 48 mixed villages, in which Greeks and Turks lived in peace and friendship. But in the larger urban centres the Turks either lived in their own armed enclaves or in their own neighbourhoods, keeping themselves to themselves and only rarely appearing in Greek streets, shops or cafes. And it is probably true to say that most Greeks and most Turks never knew personally any members of the other community. The absence of direct contact between Greek and Turkish people at large meant that the nationalist speech-makers (many of them old EOKA and TMT hands) and the mass media which reported the speeches and supplemented them with propaganda of their own, had an unrivalled influence on the formation of popular attitudes with regard to the other community, and beliefs as to what the causes of the intercommunal conflict were and how it ought to be resolved. For example, if the average Greek were asked to explain why there was a state of conflict between the Greek and Turkish community, he would most probably trot out some stereotype answer about 'the Greek majority', and 'the unworkable and unjust Constitution externally imposed', and 'the Turkish super-privileges' and other elements of the official picture. If he were sincere, however, he would have to admit that personally he did not quite know why the Constitution was unworkable, and that he knew and cared little about the Turkish community. Again, if he were asked whether he still wished for Cyprus to be united with Greece, he would be most unlikely to give any answer other than Yes, for Cyprus is, after all, 'Greek from the dawn of history', and her 'destiny' is to be incorporated into 'the national trunk, mother Greece'. It is a matter of deep regret that, despite four years of glorious struggle, certain 'external factors' have made union 'not feasible'. But again, if our average Greek were sincere, he would have to admit that, as it happened, he had not been much concerned with enosis lately. It is a well-known fact that many Greek Cypriots developed a positive dislike for mainland Greeks, whom they called 'kalamarades' (rather like 'Boche' is to 'German'). This was particularly true as regards Greek Army officers who were sent by the Athens Government to lead a National Guard of reluctant Greek Cypriot conscripts. After 21st April 1967, when an Army coup in Greece brought to power a military junta, many of these officers engaged in propaganda on behalf of the dictatorship and this made them even more dislikable in the eyes of many Greek Cypriots. Indeed, many Greek Cypriots would not want, under the circumstances, enosis, even if it were offered them (which does not mean would dare say so in public). The overwhelming mass support which Greek Cypriots gave Makarios, even after September 1971, when Grivas returned to Cyprus, thus offering his people an alternative focus of nationalist loyalty may be explained by at least three reasons. (i) Makarios had been the Ethnarch since 1950, a national leader with a tremendous prestige in the Hellenic world. Supporting him meant, among other things, claiming membership (or appearing in public to claim membership) of a great and distinguished nationalist movement which had been glorified and sanctified by the EOKA heroes. To take up a position other than a nationalist one was unpresentable, and possibly harmful. (ii) Makariosite nationalism, as contrasted to Grivasite nationalism, meant advocating or supporting the idea of a Greek-dominated Cyprus for the foreseeable future. This idea accorded, in one way or another, with the thoughts and feelings of most Greek Cypriots. Many of these people did not really want to be ruled by the Athens Government, for economic, political, snobbish and other reasons; and many others, while wanting enosis if this were offered them, were unwilling to go out to fight for it. So they all repeated after Makarios (to take a typical example of slogan-throwing, taken from his speech at Yialousa village on 14th March 1971): Cyprus is Greek. Cyprus was Greek since the dawn of her history, and will remain Greek; Greek and undivided we have taken her over; Greek and undivided we shall preserve her; Greek and undivided we shall deliver her to Greece... - knowing full well that in practical effect, Makariosite nationalism boils down to a respectable form of Greek Cypriotism. As far as the majority of Greek Cypriots were concerned, their concept of which their country was and their concept of what people they were (the two traditionally distinct concepts of statehood and nationhood) had eventually become identified. They were Greek Cypriots, living in a Greek Cypriot State - so, no further national struggle was necessary. (iii) Makarios, then, came to stand for the avoidance of war, and further, for political and economic stability. As material prosperity began to spread from the upper socio-economic classes downwards, eventually affecting the living standards and expectations of most sections of the Greek community, the prospect of a renewed struggle which Grivas advocated seemed more and more undesirable. The last point is of great importance and must be pursued a little further. A brief digression on the development of the Cyprus economy could contribute to an understanding of the changes in the political attitudes of the Greek Cypriot people.     http://www.cyprus-conflict.net/zenon,%201963-74.html                                                                                           continue >>>

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• Why are Turks and Greeks in conflict ?
• Forthcoming seminars and other events
• Examples of the work of the Association
• How to Join ACGTA
• Links to Other Sites

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Aims of the Association

The Association for Cypriot, Greek and Turkish Affairs was established to :

• Promote the development and dissemination of knowledge and understanding of contemporary social, political, economic and cultural affairs in Cyprus, Greece and Turkey so as to promote good and friendly relations between these countries;
• Encourage mutual understanding and respect between the peoples of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey;
• Provide a forum for discussion and exchange of social and political ideas, free from any physical, psychological, legal or other impediment.

To these ends, the Association organizes conferences, symposia, seminars, lectures and other activities in which scholars, jounalists, politicians, lawyers and other persons with a special knowledge of, or interest in, Cyprus, Greece and Turkey exhange or discuss information, analyses, views and ideas.

Association Address

The Association for Cypriot, Greek & Turkish Affairs,
Mr. Z. Stavrinides, Secretary,
17 Scott Hall Square,
Leeds LS7 3JN,
United Kingdom
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Why are Turks and Greeks in conflict ?

As a very short introduction, the two peoples have been traditionally divided along cultural and religious (Islam vs. Orthodox Christianity) lines. Both have at different times, and each for many centuries, lived on lands under dispute and both claim to have been oppressed during the years spent under the rule of the other side. The two nations have been in armed conflict of some form or another since approximately the 11th Century. This summary, though a gross oversimplification intented for the completely uninitiated, does apply to Cyprus.
As far as the Cyprus Problem is concerned in order to read the two sides of the argument click Greek / Greek Cypriot view or the Turkish / Turkish Cypriot view. These are provided here for the reader's information; ACGTA does not hold a specific position on the subject and therefore does not identify itself with either of the above.
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Forthcoming seminars and other events

The following seminars are free and open to the pubic. Please note particular venue for each seminar.
IN 1969 CLERIDES AND DENKTASH ALMOST MADE IT - WHAT WENT WRONG?
An analysis of material contained in recently released British official documents ( Summary here ! )
Friday 7 April 2000 at 6.30 p.m.
by Prof. Salahi Sonyel, Near East University, Nicosia
Chairman: Dr Zenon Stavrinides
 Venue : Friends House (room 10), 173-177 Euston Rd., London NW1 2BJ
(Opposite Euston Railway and Tube Stations)

THE PROSPECTS FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS
Friday 28 January 2000 at 6.30 p.m.
by Mr Robert McDonald, Freelance Writer, Broadcaster and Contributor to the Economist Intelligence Unit.
Chairman: Mr Alper Riza, QC
 Venue : Friends House (room 10), 173-177 Euston Rd., London NW1 2BJ
(Opposite Euston Railway and Tube Stations)
The Bank of Cyprus (London) has asked us to convey to all our members and friends a cordial invitation to attend the following lecture:
WOMEN IN POLITICS AND PEACEMAKING
Monday 6 March 2000 at 6.45 pm
by Kate Clerides, Member of the House of Representatives, Republic of Cyprus,
 Venue : The Hellenic Centre, 16-18 Paddington Street, London W1M 4AS For further inquiries telephone The Hellenic Centre on 020 7486 9196.
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Examples of the work of the Association

Click here to read some Seminar Summaries and other material produced by ACGTA.

• "IS A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT IN CYPRUS STILL POSSIBLE ? Revisiting the Ghali Set of Ideas", by Zenon Stavrinides.
• "THE PROSPECTS FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN GREECE, TURKEY AND CYPRUS", by Mr Robert McDonald. Click here for the full text of this very successful seminar !
• "Ethnic Conflict and the Reconstruction of National Identity in Former Yugoslavia" by Tim Boatswain, Luton University.
• "Mass Media and National Identity: An examination of the psychological mechanisms involved" by Dr Michael Moutoussis. Click here for a summary.
• "Turkey's approach to EU membership: a problem of credibility" by Dr. Mehmet Ugur, of the University of Greewich
• "Cyprus: Security, Identity and and Nation Building" by Dr. Demetrios Theophylactou, Political Scientist. This seminar was based on a book with the same title. If you are interested, let usknow.
• Why, so far, the Cyprus Problem has Remained Unsolved ? by Michael Moran, formely of the University of Sussex. ( This paper may be obtained by post by sending the ACGTA secretary a large SAE )

How to Join ACGTA

The Membership year is according to the academic timetable, from 1 September to 31 August.
If you support the aims of the Association, and you wish to receive advance information about, and participate in, its various activities, you are invited to become a member. Current membership fee is UK£10.00, except for full-time students which is UK£5.00.

Registration Form to Mail or Fax

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Last modified 1 March 2000
http://www.peace-cyprus.org/ACGTA/