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1975 March 10, 00:00 (Monday)
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P860114-1573_MC_b
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SECRET
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UNCLASSIFIED
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NODIS
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22693
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GS
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TEXT ONLINE
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MC
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-- Not Assigned --
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White House
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MEMORANDUM
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 1 -
MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION
PARTICIPANTS: Melih Esenbel, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey
Sukru Elekdag, Secretary General, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Necdet Tezel, Director General of Political Affairs
Ercument Yavuzalp, Director General for Mutual Security
Ecmel Barutcu, Director for Cyprus and Greek Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. William Macomber, United States Ambassador to Turkey
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff
TIME AND DATE: Monday, March 10, 1975
5:20 - 6:30 p.m.
PLACE: The Foreign Minister's Office
Ankara, Turkey
SUBJECTS: Aid Cut-off; Cyprus
Esenbel: This used to be a Cabinet room. Now there is a bigger one
downstairs.
[Photographers are let in.]
In Ankara there are about six papers.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 2 -
Esenbel: Yes.
Well, I welcome you here to Ankara, Mr. Secretary. It is a long time
that we have been planning for this visit. We have long hoped you could
make it. It is useful that we exchange views so we know where we stand
on these two matters -- the military aid matter in Washington and your
exchange of views with Bitsios.
Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I want to express appreciation that
you receive me, first, on short notice, and second in a time that is
not easy in our relationship, when the U.S. Congress has taken an
action which is totally wrong and with which we totally disagree. I
appreciate it.
I wanted to come after all my exchange with Bitsios because there are
certain developments which I believe come a little closer to the
Turkish point of view. With respect to the aid matter: I am at your
disposal if you wish to discuss the subject. I understand you had a
talk with my colleagues [Hartman and Macomber] this morning.
Aid Cut-off
Esenbel: Yes. On aid we said that we face heavy pressure -- not
demonstrations or the usual, but you must realize how difficult it is
to face up to these pressures -- from the parties and the
intelligentsia and the military. We tell them that the U.S. Congress
seems to understand their mistake. But you must realize there is a
limit to what the Government can do. The time limit is approaching.
We have a government crisis now, so maybe there are some additional
days for this, but soon the question will come up again. The press
started to criticize me this morning instead of you.
Kissinger: If someone has to be criticized, that is a good solution.
[Laughter]
Esenbel: The people want some action. This is what was wrong with the
Congressional action -- really they didn't care about Turkish
sensitivities. They certainly destroyed something here and they didn't
care. This is the crucial point -- that they could do it without caring
about the people. It's not a money question.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 3 -
Kissinger: No, I understand.
Esenbel: That they say "Make progress and come back in sixty days."
This is completely wrong.
Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I needn't tell you what my sentiments
are.. I have said publicly that we are giving aid to Turkey not as a
favor to Turkey but because it serves our mutual interests. I said this
at the airport. I remember, even if the Congressmen don't, that Turkey
sent troops to Korea, an area where Turkey had no interest, and whose
prisoners -- we had a study made -- were the only ones who never
cooperated with the Koreans, and the North Koreans are very brutal.
Just as aid to Turkey got us into international affairs, the cutoff can
be a way to get us out of international affairs. It wasn't directed
against Turkey -- it was an attempt to destroy our foreign policy. It
reflects, in my view, deep-seated attitudes, and is not anti-Turkey.
I believe we can change this. But because the people attacking it are
attacking our whole foreign policy, it will be more difficult. If we
had a secret vote, we could get it reversed. The problem now is how
people can admit that they were wrong six weeks after the initial vote.
It's a problem of political prestige for some.
I hope you will look at it as the sickness of an old friend, not as
something directed against Turkey. And show some patience.
Strangely, in America I'm accused of what you are -- that my actions
are encouraging you. That if it were not for me, you'd have done what
they asked. As Bill Macomber told you, we have introduced legislation
and hope to get it passed in a couple of weeks.
Macomber: In the Senate.
Kissinger: I believe if we can give some of the people who feel guilty
an excuse to change their minds, we would have a fairly easy task. If
we could. As soon as I finish the current negotiation in the Middle
East, maybe in two weeks, I'll bring Bill back and we'll make a massive
effort.
We have had a legal analysis done, according to which it might be
possible to restore spare parts more quickly if the President and the
leadership cooperate.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 4 -
Esenbel: A waiver.
Kissinger: No it's a special authority for MAP, for up to $50 million.
The difficulty is that if we use that waiver, they might not repeal the
law. And we can use it only for one year. And next year we may not have
the law changed. Therefore the President is very reluctant to do that.
The only way to use the waiver is if the President with the tacit
approval of the leaders and of the Greek lobby ….. the Greek lobby may
next year go after the waiver. But if you're under a tremendous time
pressure, we may want to use the waiver.
Therefore I wanted to explain the choice we have.
Esenbel: You explained that before. You said that is the easiest road
maybe, and the legislation would remain. And the Congressmen are
reluctant to seem to admit the action was wrong, and then they'll say,
"Why the problem? They have the $50 million." We agree with you; we're
against it. And we don't want that.
Kissinger: Thank you. I appreciate it.
Esenbel: Aid is a long-term need. Aid is a substantial part of our
relationship. We want this to be restored. We're not interested in aid
programs of 40 days, 50 days -- not that kind of relationship.
Kissinger: I agree with you.
Esenbel: We want to know where we're standing. So people know they can
trust the United States as an ally, and erase all doubts. With these
40-day waivers, we can't do that.
Kissinger: The waiver wouldn't be 40 days but for a year. But you're
morally right; aid should be restored. I know the President would
prefer to restore aid for many reasons -- one, for the principle, and
second, he doesn't want to be dependent on Mr. Brademas, letting
Brademas say he's helped and then go back to his original line. He's
prepared to just declare that progress has been made, if he's going to
bend the law. He wants the principle to be restored, and he's prepared
to make an all-out effort.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 5 -
Esenbel: We approached the Europeans and Luns and he's supposed to come
forward with an answer.
Kissinger: We approached the Germans. Did they start?
Yavuzalp: Not hardware; only subsidiary items. This has nothing to do
with the spare parts we need.
Kissinger: [to Hartman] Art, can you go to Bonn and see Genscher and
Leber? And see Haig.
Esenbel: You should brief Ecevit.
Kissinger: Ecevit can be very helpful. Art will see the Germans on the
way home and also see Haig to see about getting surplus parts out of
stocks. And [Ambassador David] Bruce was helpful.
Esenbel: The Europeans should find ways to meet quick needs; for
example, the Air Force needs spare parts. For other items that they
can't find in the stocks, maybe you could make a deal with the Dutch or
others to send it here.
Macomber: That is illegal.
Kissinger: Before the Freedom of Information Act, I used to say at
meetings, "The illegal we do immediately; the unconstitutional takes a
little longer." [laughter] But since the Freedom of Information Act,
I'm afraid to say things like that.
We'll make a major effort.
Esenbel: Your Ambassador told me the opposite. In Germany they said
they delayed it one week so it looks like it happens after your visit.
Kissinger: My understanding is that the aid is now in force. They
informed us.
Yavuzalp: The political decision is made, they say, but they're waiting
for "appropriate timing" for implementation of the political decision.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 6 -
Kissinger: [to Hartman] Talk to Genscher and say I attach enormous
importance to that.
Esenbel: The difficulty is they signed an agreement but they don't go
ahead and implement it -- they do it piecemeal.
Kissinger: I'm sending Art to Bonn. If there are difficulties, I'll
consider stopping in Bonn.
Yavuzalp: Our ambassador would be aware of the latest.
Hartman: In Bonn.
Yavuzalp: In Bonn.
Kissinger: We have to do it somewhat quietly, so there shouldn't be
news stories. [Secretary Kissinger confers with Ambassador Macomber]
One more word about aid. In the nature of things, it will take us some
time. It will take us two weeks in the Senate, and then some time to
see where we stand in the House.
Macomber: And there is a recess, so if we don't get it in two weeks, it
will take two more before they reconvene.
Kissinger: It is not possible before April. If we succeed in the Middle
East, it will give me a lot of influence even though it has nothing to
do with it. And if the Cyprus thing goes the way it might go, it would
be more possible.The law might lapse automatically if there is a
settlement. So we might just declare substantial progress and fight
rather with the Congress over the finding of substantial progress. That
we can consider in April.
[Each
side
confers.]
Esenbel: As the Secretary General reminds me, time is really pressing.
We're enjoying a few days when the opposition doesn't want to shake us,
but when the Government is formed, it will start. The people feel that
the NATO Treaty Article III says that allies should help each other and
not embargo each other, which is something done to an enemy. And the US
is supplying arms to 100 countries and has put an embargo to Turkey.
And if there is too much delay, they will lose their patience.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 7 -
Elekdag: They see it as a punishment to Turkey for not following the
policy line of the United States. This is how public opinion sees it.
They are a little lenient now, but when the Government is formed, there
will be a burst. How can the US do this with Turkey, a faithful ally?
The intelligentsia see it as an unwritten law of NATO that there should
not be an embargo on military sales.
Kissinger: I agree with you. I'm not your problem. I fought against it
before it was put on, and I'm fighting against it now.
There are three options: One is to apply a waiver, but that would make
it harder to change the law. Whenever your political pressures get too
great, you can ask us. Second, we can find substantial progress under
the existing law. This may be possible because, strangely, the Greeks
have been making concessions, not the Turks. The third is to change the
law.
If your domestic situation gets too complex, you can tell Bill. To
change the law, it requires talking to Congressmen; that will take
Bill, Art, and myself. So there is the legislative calendar. And we
don't want a negative vote. So these are the complexities. If your
situation gets too complex, we can do a waiver.
If we do it, we should do it for less than $50 million, so it's not
seen as a substitute for changing the law. We should limit it to the
essential parts.
Esenbel: You say a smaller amount is preferable. Then it won't have any
effect here. I'm supposing we won't do it by a waiver.
Kissinger: I haven't thought it through. You can tell us what you need.
We don't think it's a good way to proceed. The President doesn't.
Esenbel: We don't like it either. Our military told us they don't like
it. You should work on the Senate. Our people tell us to talk to
Javits. One of our Senators met him and talked to him. He said, "I'm a
friend of Turkey. Are you a politician or a diplomat?" Our Senator said
he was a politician. Javits said, "So am I and I have to vote against
it."
Kissinger: But we're beginning to turn that around.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 8 -
Esenbel: I talked to Rosenthal in his office and lost two hours with
Rosenthal. He said he needed to "tilt" toward Caramanlis. He said, "I
have to give something."
Kissinger: But that was last fall.
Esenbel: That's worrisome, that they can think so lightly of Turkey.
Kissinger: It has nothing to do with Turkey. It was the result of the
unusual conditions of last year -- the result of Watergate, of an
unelected President and in an election period, when all were terrified.
So I think it's a mistake to take it as against Turkey. What would have
happened normally would be a sense of Congress resolution, and we'd
ignore it. I think it ran away with him.
Macomber: They didn't think it would pass.
Kissinger: That's another thing. They thought it would pass and we'd
veto it and it would stand. But it happened just after the President
had pardoned President Nixon. Now we need a way to help them find a way
to reverse themselves. The mood as late as January was very bad. The
mood now is defensive.
Macomber: You're absolutely right, sir. The mood in the Senate is
shifting; you can feel it. In the House, it's not so noticeable. In the
House, the leadership is for a change. But the problem is how these
people can explain a turnaround.
CYPRUS
Kissinger: Let's talk a few minutes of Cyprus. Without your making
concessions, perhaps we can show progress and they can say they're
helping progress.
Let me say this on Cyprus. We have spent our previous discussions of
Cyprus perhaps not on the fundamental problems. We talked about
Famagusta airport. This was partly because of Congress; we wanted to
show progress. But as you've said, the heart of the problem is the
administrative structure of Cyprus, and perhaps in that framework the
solution to the other problems can be found.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 9 -
My impression -- this is not a Greek message but my impression -- is
that we could persuade the Greeks to accept a bizonal solution if your
area is reduced in size. They are worried that if the Greek area is so
small, it would lead to a massive exodus from the island. Which would
lead to … a political impossibility for the Greek government.
They have not yet said they would accept a bizonal solution, but my
impression is they could be convinced to move in that direction if the
area could be reduced.
Bitsios talked especially of the Morphou area and of the areas south of
the Famagusta-Nicosia road. South of the old road, between the lower
and upper road. I didn't press it.
He did point out, however, that while he wants the Morphou area, there
is a Turkish population west of Kyrenia.
Esenbel: Lefka.
Kissinger: Lefka, which would clearly have to be part of the Turkish
zone.
So it's my impression from talking to Bitsios that he wants the
negotiation to start again. And he wants the negotiations to start
outside of Nicosia -- for reasons we all agree on. That's his interest
in the UN -- whether it's New York, Vienna or Geneva. He prefers New
York, but that's a secondary question.
For the first time, I detected a willingness to discuss a bizonal …
rather, that his mind was moving in that direction. But it was related
to the reduction of the territory. Our Ambassador has that impression.
With respect to Makarios as President of that new Government, it is not
out of the question that a proposition could be made to the Greeks.
If this is possible, then it is in everyone's interest to drop the
secondary issues and see whether it can be settled. Then Turkey would
get international recognition of your basic position -- a bizonal
solution. If the area is reduced -- you're the best judge. And the
basic structure of the island. And the other issues could then perhaps
more easily be settled.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 10 -
This is why I asked to come here. If you ask them flatly now -- "Do you
accept a bizonal solution?" they'll say no. But I think it can be moved
in that direction. And you should think whether it would be better to
remove this from the international agenda. Makarios' strategy is
obvious -- he wants the Russians in. We have received a letter from
Brezhnev which we have not answered in three weeks, asking for
internationalization. If it comes to that, the technique would be
impossible. This isn't my proposal to you; it's my impression of the
Greek position. The curious thing is that the aid cutoff has made the
Greeks more flexible, not the Turks. [Laughter] It's a paradox but it's
the result.
If a negotiation in that framework could get started, rather than waive
the law we could just say that substantial progress has been made. It
would take a lot of nerve for the Congress to defy us. And the Greeks
would have reason to be cautious, because if it's cut off and you walk
out, they get nothing.
I talked to Clerides. I can speak to his view more certainly. I believe
he would go along with this.
It would be a totally different Congressional situation if the obstacle
were Makarios. We would see very early on in the negotiation whether
the Greeks would accept a bizonal solution; if the obstacle is
Makarios…. I'm having a memorandum prepared -- we're speaking as
friends -- of the Greek Cypriot press. If it's Makarios against the US,
that we can handle domestically.
You needn't decide now. We're not pressing you.
I have the impression that Caramanlis wants a rapid solution. I told
Bitsios that any solution will be worse for Greece. I said, "The longer
you wait, the more you make it a domestic issue. The only differences
are a little more or a little less; whatever you get, your critics can
still accuse you of a bad agreement." He said, "I agree with you." Our
Ambassador saw Caramanlis yesterday afternoon, and Caramanlis agreed
with this analysis. Therefore what I say to you is in my judgment
achievable with the Greek Government. Caramanlis did make the point
that beyond a certain point it would be unmanageable for him -- for
example, if there was a mass exodus from the island, it would be a
disaster for him. So it has to be enough for the Greek population to
live in.
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 11 -
I said I didn't know whether the Turks would accept Makarios as
President.
Of course, at one point you asked for his return. [Laughter]
[A map of Cyprus is brought out and placed on the
table. Secretary Kissinger indicates on the map:]
Here, below the road, between the old road and the new road, he said he
needed something. Below the old road.
He showed me something on the map but I didn't take it down because I
didn't think this was for me to negotiate. He didn't say that was all,
but he did mention those two areas. Plus if it causes an exodus.
He didn't say the whole area between the roads.
Esenbel: Did he mean negotiations between Clerides and Denktash or
between us?
Kissinger: He said he needed an excuse to resume the talks after you
declared this [autonomous state]. So he can't go back to the same
talks. This is his interest in the UN. So his idea is for you to meet
over the Aegean, and of course while you and he meet on the Aegean no
one can keep you from talking about something else. But he can't meet
on the Aegean until the other talks start.
He agrees it shouldn't be internationalized.
He said the trend toward war, even though it would be disastrous, would
be hard to avoid if there is no solution. He didn't want it -- and this
was not said in a threatening way. He realizes it would be a disaster
for Greece.
Esenbel: That is one point we agree on -- the last point. [Laughter]
Kissinger: I asked our Ambassador to check my analysis with him, and at
the end he said…
Esenbel: We hope the talks will be resumed and we checked with your
Ambassador and Mr. Hartman.
Kissinger: What is happening in New York?
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS - 12 -
Esenbel: They're meeting now. We hope there will be a resolution to ask
the Secretary General to convene the talks somewhere. We hope not in
New York.
Kissinger: What do you have against New York? I'm not pushing it.
Esenbel: It shouldn't be under the United Nations nor should the UN be
involved; it should be something solved by the people of Cyprus. I
talked to the Secretary General and he agreed.
Kissinger: What about Vienna?
Esenbel: Yes, we proposed Vienna. His man can attend, as Weckmann did.
Sisco: In light of what the Secretary said, it is all the more
important to get something settled in New York.
Kissinger: Given Waldheim's vanity, it will be hard to keep him out of
the talks. [Laughter] Given his general level of competence, what
damage can he do? [Laughter]
Esenbel: He was jotting down my words.
Kissinger: We have sent a message to Bitsios this morning that we want
something worked out on the basis of a consensus with Turkey. We
couldn't get directly involved in the drafting because we would be
always behind events. But Buffum is instructed to work constructively.
Esenbel: We will meet tomorrow.
Kissinger: The difficulty will be -- [bear this in mind] when you
gentlemen consult among yourselves -- the Greeks can't accept a bizonal
arrangement unless the area is reduced. If you ask them now if they
accept a bizonal solution, they'll say no. But if we can combine them
some way so that when they agree to a bizonal arrangement they'll have
some assurance of a reduction of the area….
[The meeting ended at 6:30 p.m. ]
SECRET/NODIS/XGDS
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